Title: How does introspection operate?

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Abstract:

Some philosophers claim that introspection is a single process which probes one’s mental states (single-process model); others claim that multiple cognitive processes contribute to introspection (pluralist-process model). Although I take advantage of some of the merits of the pluralist-process model, I defend the thesis that introspection is irreducible to other processes of mechanisms of access. I claim that introspection is a sui generis process that orchestrates a plural framework that combines and integrates several variables or mental phenomena (such as mental imagery and inner speech) and cognitive processes (such as attention, memory and inference). To account for this view, I argue that introspection is a selective, cumulative, and predictive process. I then go on to provide the grounds for constructing a theory of introspection by determining those variables in accordance with specific empirical cases.